In contrast to the Turkish pasition, this artiele argues that a comprehensive interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne reveals that the appIication of the 'principle of reciprocity' aııows Greece to maintain a military presence in the said islands relative to that of the Turkish forces stationed on the coast of Asia Minor. This argument is fundamentally different that those advanced by Athens regarding the right of Greece to re-militarise its Eastern Aegean islands.
In so doing, the artiele will fırst provide a critical analysis of the views of the Turkish and Greek governments. Second, drawing on the records of proceedings of the Lausanne Conference, it will give an interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty that shows why and how Greece obtains the legal right of militarising the islands in question. One should, however, begin by discussing what the international law itself provides for the interpretation of treaties. [VOL. XXIX There are three approaches to treaty interpretation. and emphasises the analysis of the words used. In this context, the demilitarisation question can be addressed with reference to the text of the Lausanne Treaty. This approach is favoured by both the Turkish and Greek Governments.
Interpretation of Treaties
The second approach emphasises the objects and purpose of the treaty. Thus, to judge whether Greeee has violated the Lausanne Treaty by militarising the said islands requires an examination of the object and purposes of that treaty. Neither of the two governments h~s tried so far to resort to this type of interpretation.
The third approach looks to the intention of the parties adopting the agreement. This implies that the demilitarisation issue ean be examined in relation to the intentions of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne. Usually, such intentions are made clear during the negotiation process. Thus, the records of proeeedings of the Lausanne Conferenee as well as the treaty draft are valuable to the interpretation of the treaty eoncerned. Onee again, neither the Turkish nor the Greek Government has been so far interested in this type of interpretation.
The three approaches are mentioned in the artieles 3 i and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The jurisprudence of the International Court supports the textual approach that is adopted in substance in the artiele 31 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the International Law Commission and the Vienna Convention itself gaye cautious qualification to the textual approach by permitting resouree to further means of interpretation.
Resouree may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the lreaty and the eireumstanees of iıs eonelusion.
in order to eonfirm the meaning resulling from the applieation of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to aniele 31: a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obseure; or b) leads to a resull whieh is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
The practice of the International Court, however, has shown that the textual approach has considerably followed the doctrine of 'ordinary meaning'2 which involves the presumption that a meaning, other than the ordinary one. may be established. but its proponent has the burden of proof. 3 Reliance on the doctrine of 'ordinary meaning' seems to be the preference of the Greek Govemment. As it will be shown later, Athens has identified a number of issues that are viewed as a reasonablc justification for its decision to increase the degree of its military presence in the Eastern Aegean islandso Examining the demilitarisation question. the author of this article alsa relies on the doctrine of 'ordinary meaning' in interpreting the Lausanne Treaty. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to provide the necessary proof that justifies the employment of that doctrineo In so doing, emphasis will be given to the preparatory work of the Lausanne Confercnce.
As it has been shown, a coroııary to the principle of 'ordinary meaning' is the principle of 'integration' which implies that the meaning must emerge in the context of the treaty as a whole. and in the light of its objects and purposes. 4 This means that in the court practice the first two approaches to treaty interpretation mentioned above may merge with one anather. Mareaver, on a number of occasions, the International Court has used preparatory work to confirın a candusian reached by other means. 5 Thus. in 2Browlie, Principles of Public Internalional Law, p. 628. 3 Ibido, po 629 o 41bido 5lbido. po 6300 the court practice the first and third approaches to treaty inteıpretation may also merge with one another.
Additionally, textual treaty inteıpretation is based on two different methods: the 'restrlctive' and the 'effective' inteıprctation. 6 in a number of cases, the International Court committed itself to the principle that provisions implying a limitation of state sovereignty should receive restrlctive inteıpretation. Because the demilitarisation requirement embodied in the Lausanne and Paris Peaee Treaties impose a limitation to the sovereign right of Greeec to militarise the islands in question, the Turkish Government may invoke a restrlctive textual inteıpretation of those treaties. However, it has been argued that restrletive textual inteıpretation, as a general prineiple of treaty inteıpretation, is questionable. 7 Indeed, in reeent years various tribunals have given less seope to the restrietive principle which did not, in faet, find a place in the provisions of Vienna Convcntion. Instead, the principle of 'effeetive' inteıpretation has been of ten invoked whieh implies that a treaty should bc inteıprcted according to the doctrine of 'ordinary meaning'. Due to the above factors, it has been argued that any tme inteıpretation of a treaty will have to take into aceount all aspects of an agreement, from the words employed to the intention of the parti es and the aims of the particular doeument, and that it is not possible to exclude completely any one of the se components. 8 Consequently, for providing a comprehcnsive inteıprctation of the Lausanne Treaty, as it is related to the demilitarisation question, the present artiele will employ alı three approaches to treaty inteıpretation. The Turkish Government maintains that Grcece continues to violate international agreements concerning the demilitarisation of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands. In support for its position, Ankara points to recent Greek press reports according to which MM-40 EXOCET guided missile batteries are to be deployed on the Aegean islands which are under demilitarised status. Ankara considers such a deployment as totally unacceptable and most provocative.
Turkey maintains that no international document has ever even implicitIy given Greece the right to re-militarise the islands in question and that Greek claims to the contrary have bcen based on allegations and interpretations that carry neither conviction nor validity. To substantiate its arguments, Ankara has put forward the following arguments: First, the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria were eeded to Greeee by the 1914 Decision of the Six Powers (England, Franee, Russia, Germany, ıtalyand Austria-Hungary) on eondition that they will be kept demilitarised and Greece agreed to this status.
Second, in its Artiele 12, the Lausanne Peaee Treaty of 1923 eonfirmed the 1914 Decision in its entircty. Artiele 13 of the said treaty stipulated the modalities of demilitarisation for those islands and imposed eertain restrietions related to the presenee of military forees and establishment of fortifıeations, which Greeee undertoak to observe.
Finaııy, the demilitarisation principle was re-eonfırmed in 1947, by the Paris Peaee Treaty which eeded the Dodecanese Islands and their adjaeent islets to Greeee. This Treaty sought to reconcile Greek sovereignty over these islands with the seeurity of Turkey by stipulating in Artiele 14 that 'these islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised'.
In rcsponse to the Greek elaim that the Turkish Fourtb Army (popularly known as the Aegean Army) constitutes a threat to the seeurity of the Greek islands and whose re-militarisation is, eonsequently, imperative, Ankara advances the foııowing arguments:
First, eontrary to the status of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands, the Turkish territories of the Aegean region are not under any demilitarised status.
Second, the Fourtb Army is basically a training army that has be en established on legal ground and has a defensive character.
Third, the rules of international lawand the provisions of treaties should not be invoked seleetively or arbitrarily. The Greek arguments to evoke eertain provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties in order to circumvent internationally binding obligations are groundless and consequently unacceptable.
Fourth, the same is true of Greek appeals to the applicability of the concept of legitimate self-defence. Exccpt for the circumstances stated in the United Nations Charter, this principle eannot be evoked. Moreover, historieally, no Greek territory has ever been oeeupied by Turkey to demonstrate that such Greek claims are nothing but vaeuous and inappropriate.
Fifth, the Greek Notes of 1964 and 1969 aeeentuated that Greeee respceted its treaty obligations and did not argue, as Athens has more reeently done, that sinee Turkey was not a party to the Paris Treaty, Ankara cannot claim any right from the said Treaty, while on eertain other issues, Greeee has tried to resort to the principle of pacta sund servanda.
FinaIly, the data provided by Greeee under the Vienna Doeument of 1992 and the Treaty regarding the Conventional Forees in Europe (CFE), indicating the military forces deployed on the Islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos, is a simple ruse, abusing one international agreement in a futile attempt to gloss over deliberate violation of previous eommitments. As such, they can have no effeet on the permanent demilitarised status of the islands other than demonstrating a new eonsistent disregard by Greeee of its Treaty obligations, thereby eontributing to the erosion of eonfidenee in the Aegean.
According to the Turkish Government, the demilitarisation established not only a legal, but also a real politieal status quo that was expressly reeognised and aeeepted by Greeee.10 For Ankara, this means that neither the demilitarised status of the islands nor the treaty obligations of Greeee in this respeet can be unilateraIly reversed under any pretext. The refo re , the relevant international treaties and the eontraetual obligations arising therefrom remain binding on Greeec. Moreover, Greeee never mainlained that the Turkish territories of the Aegcan region are under a demilitarised status and that the Aegean Army has not been established on legal ground. What Greeec rathcr says is that in the light of rcecnt historical facts, it is impossible to distinguish whether the Turkish Aegean Army has a defensiye character or not. In faet, the landing capabilities of this army role out its defensiye charaeter irrcspectively of whether Turkey targets Greeee. Since, a distinetion between what is offensiye and what defensiye cannot be established in this case, the Greek Government, as any other govemment, is obliged to preparc the country for the worst-case scenario. it is, therefore, the working of the power-security dilernma and not any intentions against Turkey that has led Greece to increase the degree of its military presence in the Eastem Aegean islands.
A Critical Examination of the Turkish View
Third, the Turkish Govemment does not distinguish between treaties that restrain Greeec from re-militarising its Eastem Aegean islands and principles of international law that reeognise Athens the right to self-defence.
it is a question whether legality tak es precedenee over the maintenance of territorial intcgrity. it is not that Grccce wants to be unlawful, but rather whether it is pushed by the cireumstanees and the operation of the power-security dilernma to be as such. 13 Indeed, it is this dilernma that pushes Athens to consider the worst-case seenario according to whieh Turkey is an aggressive,. revisionist and anti-status quo state, irrespective of whether Turkey is really such a state. [VOL. XXIX Fourth, by characterising its 'Aegean Anny' as defensive, Turkey accepts the fact that there are some parameters that allow one tO identify whether an anny has offensive or defensive dispositions. But as far as the Greek forces stationed in the Eastem Aegean islands is concemed, Ankara makes no distinction between offensive and defensiye dispositions. In fact, Turkeyappears to be against the existence of all types of weapon systems on the said islands, no matter whether are capable of reaching its Asia Minor coast or not.
The main reason for this seems to be the Turkish belief that these weapons can be used in the event of a Grcek invasion. if this is true, then, Ankara does not take account of four factorso First, the considerable advantage that the defence enjoys which is further enhanced by the new weapon technologies. If Greece is the aggressor then the defence advantage belongs to Turkey. Second, the military superiority of Turkey of which the Turkish military establishment and Turkish politicians are very proud. Turkish statements and declarations about this superiority have served as a means for deterring Greece as well as of re-assuring the Turkish public. Third, the Eastem Aegean islands do not possess the necessary landing fleet to invade Turkey. And fourth, history shows that in case that Greeec wishes to invade Turkey, the use of those islands is not imperative.
it is true that sometimes it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish betwcen offensive and defensive weapons and fortifications.
However, many times certain weapon and fortification system s can be easily identified as offensive while others as defensive. Making no distinction between offensive and defensive system s, Ankara points to an important paradox. Because the use of advanced military technology provides considerable advantages to the defence, Turkey would oppose even to extreme measures of non-offensive defence undertaken by Greece.
14 In other words, Turkey would argue that is threatened by the high degree of Greek defensiveness.
140n the issue of non-offensive defence see J. Galtung, ıransarmament: From Offensive to Defensive Defence', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, 1984; G. Sharp, Making Europe Uncontluerable, London: Taylor and Francis, 1985; and A. Roberts. Nations in Arms. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986. Moreover, relating its security to the existence or not of weapons systems in the Greek Eastem Aegean islands, Ankara leads one to wonder whether Turkey is primarily interested in its own security or in the insecurity of the Aegean islands. Thus, Turkey allows Greece to think and argue that Ankara does not want the islands to be defended because it is much easier for it to take them over. Such a thought is conditioned by the operation of the power-security dilernma, while at the same time adds another element to its operation.
Fifth, although it is not part of the' official argumentation, many Turkish circles have pointed to threats arising from the dual use of civilian facilities existing in the Greek islands. In other words, it has been suggested that in case of war the ports of those islands can be used by the Greek navy and the civilian airports by the Greek air force. Although this argument is sound, it may lead one to wonder whether those islands should not have any ports or airports and, therefore, no communication with the out~ide world during peace-time. This argument also obscures the fact that neither the Greek navy uses the ports of the islands in question nor the Greek air foree makes use of their civilian airports; a fact that shows that Greece tries to stick to the arrangements of the Lausanne and Paris Peaee Treaties.
Sixth, the Turkish side appears to ignore the strategic distribution of Greek naval and air forces. Because under the influence of the power-security dilernma Greece is obliged to consider Turkey as a revisionist state, it would never put its naval and air forees in the front line and, consequently, in the mercy of a Turkish surprise attack. The Aegean morphology makes it clear that Greece can use many other islands that are not included in the said trcaties as bases for its naval and air forces. In fact, within the international community the belief that Turkey is committed to international lawand international legal practice has be en seriously weakened. This is not only due to the reluctance of Ankara to accept the International Court of Justice as the most appropriate means for settling its disputes with Greece, but alsa due to its practices on issues like the delimitation of the Aight Information Region (FIR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations in the Aegean, and most recently the re-negotiation of the Montreux Straits Conventian. it is not that Turkey does not have legal rights or powerful legal points to present, but rather that instead of doing it within the relevant international fora, it resorts to unilateral policies. In fact, it does what it accuses Athens of doing. The result is that it gives the impression that international lawand legal practices count only in specific circumstances; an impression that actually Ankara has of Athens.
The Greek View
The Greek view on the demilitarisation of the Eastern Aegean islands does not bear uniformity. In fact, there are two competing views: that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Ministry of Press and Mass Media. Although theyare based on the same set of facts, the views of those ministries are diametrically opposed. Though both views will be presented, the competence of the Foreign Ministry on international matters leads one to conclude that the official Greek policy on the demilitarisation issue is that of the particular ministry. According to the Ministry of Press and Mass Media, the fortification of the Greek islands is not contrary to international law becausethe situation in the Aegean after 1974 is completely different than when the treaties of Lausanne and Paris were signed. 15 According to the said ministry, in 1974 Turkey overturned the conditions on which the said treaties were based and ever since Ankara has repeatedly advanced claims conceming the Greek islands. Moreover, the above ministry maintains that Turkey has not restricted its claims to words alone and that the countless threats of war by Turkish politicians and the innumerable violations of Greek territorial sea and air space are practical illustrations of the Turkish revisionist intentions. For the said ministry, what is extremely threatening is the presence of the Turkish Aegean Army that comprises 120,000 men. According to the Ministry of Press and Mass Media, this army has no NATO commitments and is supplemented by a large landing fleet of 120 craft, which further attests to its offensive posture.
A Critical Analysis of the View of the Ministry of Press and Mass Media
Two important points should be made here. First, although, according to US estimates, the Turkish Aegean Army is equipped with landing-craft and an amphibious capability which is the second largest among NATO members, it does not comprise 120,000 men, but its peacetime force is that of 35,000 combat personneL. 16 Exaggerations in numbers do not assist the Greek case, while add to the power-security dilernma that both Greece and Turkeyare faced with. Second, the Greek Ministry of Press and Mass Media suggests that due to the change of circumstances, Greece is allowed to fortify its Eastem Aegean islands. But if this is the case, then, Greece appears to make use of the doctrine of the 'fundamental change of circumstances'.
No doubt treaties often need to be altered, to bring them into line with changing conditions. But the doctrine of the 'fundamental change of circumstances' is an unsuitable method for achieving this end. it applies only in extreme cases, and, when it does apply, its effect is not to alter a treaty, but to terminate il. i 7
Thus, resorting to the above doctrine is Iike that Greece wishes to terminate the Lausanne and Paris Peace Treaties. Moreover, if the fortification of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands is justified with reference to the said doctrine, Greece should not complain that Turkey violates the Lausanne Treaty for the simple reason that Greece itself has terminated the validity of that treaty. Yet, if Greece wishes to make use of the doctrine of 'fundamental change of circumstances', then, it justifies the Turkish position that negotiations should begin bctween the two countries with the scope of determining the new status quo in the Aegean. Greek references to the International Court bccome, consequently, irrelevant bccause the Lausanne and Paris Treaties cannot any more serve as abasis for judgement.
if Greece wanted to alter and not to terminate the above treaties, it could have done so by referring the issue to the UN General Assembly that has the power to reeommend alterations of treaties under Artiele 14 of the UN Charter. Altematively, alterations to the said treaties could be brought about only by agreement between Greece and Turkey. But neither of the two countries is prepared to agree to amendments that go against its interests. Due to the operation of the power-security dilernma, both Turkeyand Greece fear that making concessions will induce the other side to demand similar changes in other treaties. Third, the 1947 Treaty of Paris between ıtalyand the Allies provides for the demi1itarisation of the Dodecanese Islands. Turkey, however, was not a contracting party in the above Treaty, since she never participated in the Second World War.
Fourth, Article 51 of the UN Charter foresees that every country has the inalienable right of legitimate defence of its territory. Greece has not resigned its '...inherent right of individual or coIlective self-defence if an armed conflict occurs against a Member of the United Nations ...'. The exercise of this right is particularly applicable and necessary in the case of Greece, given the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the Turkish casus belli in the Aegean, transgressions of the Greek National Airspace and the dispute of Greece's sovereign rights. These do not leave Athens with much choice as to means for the defence of the country. Turkey cannot threaten Greece with war over Greek sovereign rights and then demand that Greece unilaterally disarm itself.
Fifth, the right of legitimate defence, one of the fundamental rights of the international legal ordcr, posscsses the character of jus cogens. Artiele 103 of the UN Charter states that the right of legitimate defence contained in Article 5 i overrides any conventional obligation to the contrary. Sixth, the formation, after the invasion of Cyprus, of the Turkish Aegcan Army, which is stationed exactly opposite the Greek islands, and is equipped with the largest neet of landingcraft in the Mediterranean, reveals in the most dramatic way, Turkey's aggressive intentions against Greece and forces the latter to take all necessary measures to shield the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea.
To support its reference to the Artiele 51 of the UN Charter, the Greek sidc often quotcs Turkish deelarations, such as that of the Turkish Defence Minister Hasan Isik who on 1 July 1974 stated that 'Turkey will never aIlow the Aegean to become a Greek Sea ncither will it allow to usurp Turkish rights in this area'. The Turkish Premicr Sadi ırmak was also quotcd declaring on 18 January 1975 that 'The Aegean Sea belongs to us. This is something that must be understood by alı. Wc do not intend to innovate in matters of foreign policy. if the honour and interest<; of the Turkish nation are threatencd, we shall knock the enemy's block off. Finally, the Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Çaglayangil has been quoted saying on 29 September 1976 that 'The demographic factor (in the Aegean) must not be ignored also. The population of the thousands of Aegean islands is not more than 300,000 while that of the Turkish coastal areas is ten million ' .20 In addition, the Greek side has attempted to show to the international community that Turkey pays no respect to international rules and agreements. Athens argues that when Turkey refers to international law, it mentions it in full reluctance. In every case, references to it remain a last resort that follows a failure of bilateral negotiations. Instead of the International Court of Justice, the Turkish Government prefers the invitation of a third party and if this fails, international arbitration when, evidently, bilateral negotiations have not succeeded. Finally, the Greek Government has criticised the Turkish practice towards international treaties, like the Convention on the Use of the Waters of International Rivers and the Convention on the Law of the Sea which Turkey does not consider as binding.
s. A Critical Analysis of the Greek View
A series of important points can be made. First, Greece, like Turkey, should not overlook the operation of the power-security dilernma and should, therefore, take account of the impact of its declarations and actions on the behaviour of Turkey. it is not a matter of whether Athens has the right to do something, but of the way in which it does it. Thus, Greek declarations and actions should make Turkey neither insecure nar suspicious about the Greek intentions. National pride is one thing, national security is anather. The former may lead to war; the latter seeks to prevent it. Second, even if Turkey does not respect international law, as Athens daims, this does not mean that Ankara should not be free to speak against any state that feels proud of respecting the international legal system like Greece does. Numerous cases show that even states that have consistently displayed their respect for 20Threat in the Aegean, pp. 4-5.
international law have violated international agreements, the UN Charter as well as decisions of international tribunals. Yet, even if Turkey does not respect international law this does not mean that other states should do the same. If Greek actions are contrary to international lawand practice, Turkey has the right and duty of pointing that out. The law does not make a distinction between similar crimes but only between the conditions under which the criminal acts take place.
Third, the fact that Turkey considers some treaties as not binding upm~it is not something necessary illega!. In fact, there are international rules that may point to the right of Ankara not to be bound by those treaties. What really weakens Turkey is its reluctance to solve lcgal questions associated with the application of international law by bringing its case be fo re the International Court of Justice.
Fourth, unlike the Ministry of Press, the Greek Foreign Ministry does not rcsort to the doctrine of the 'fundamental change of circumstances'.
This means that for Greece, the treaties of Lausanne and Paris remain the bases of international legal order in the Aegean. .
Fifth, the Foreign Ministry correctly points out that the Treaty of Lausanne granted the Greek Eastem Aegean islands only parti al and not full demilitarisation.
Sixth, the Turkish deelarations and actions not only add to the operation of the power-security dilernma, but they also seem to justify Greek references to Artiele 51 of the UN Charter.
Finally, the Greek argument that Turkey was not a contracting party in the Paris Peace Treaty is irrelevant. The said treaty İtself specifies in the Artiele 14 that the Dodecanese Islands and their adjacent islcts '...shall be and shall remain demilitarised'. This leads to the conclusion that the degree of militarisation for those islands should be similar to those of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria. Having analysed the Turkish and Greek views on the issue, the artiele will proceed to the interpretation of the Lausanne 'Freaty.
The Lausanne Pea ce Treaty: Textual Interpretation
Artiele 13 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulates:
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With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Governmcnt undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria: i) No nava1 base and no fortification will be established in the said islands. 2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Govemment will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.
3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.
Leaving aside the conditions that may allow Greece to invoke Artiele 51 of the UN Charter, a 'restrictive' textual interpretation of Artiele 13 leads to the following conelusion. Unless the current Greek forees, bases and fortifications in the said islands as well as the Dodecanese Islands and their adjaccnt islets match the conditions specified in the above artiele, Greece violates the demilitarisation elauses of the Lausanne and Paris Treaties. On the other hand, an 'cffective' interpretation leads to another conclusion.
Dealing with countries with a long history of conflict between them and just coming out from a war with each other, the makers of the Lausanne Treaty could have never allowed Greece and Turkey to pose threats to each other. This condition was not only to apply in 1923 or immediately af ter, but also for the years to come. The treaty makers were confronted with two problems. First, what it should be done to minimise the potential for a new conflict betwecn Greece and Turkey in a short and mcdium-term; and second, what military measures should be undertaken by both Greece and Turkey to prevent a future war between them.
The answer to the fırst problem was the definition of miIitary measures that should apply immediately. But the answer to the second problem required that a balance between the thcn present and the future to be found. The Lausanne Treaty-makers established this balance with reference to the 'principle of reciprocity' that is mentioned in Artiele 13. According to this principle, a balance of forces should exist in the Eastem Aegean so that neither the Greek forces stationed in the Eastem Aegean ı ı 8 THE TIJRKlSH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXiX islands can threaten Turkey nor the Turkish forees stationed at the Asia Minor eoast can threaten the Greek Eastem Aegean islands. if Turkey was to decide for any reason to inerease its military presenee in the Asia Minor, then, Greeee was to be allowed to reeiproeate by inereasing its own military presenee in the said islands. This did not mean that the Greek forees in the Eastem Aegean islands should be neeessarily similar to those of Turkey loeated at the eoast of Asia Minor. it rather meant that the Greek forees should be adequate to resist a possible attaek from the Turkish forees.
The 'prineiple of reeiproeity', as it has been applied by the Lausanne Treaty, works one way. In other words, the Greek forees in the said islands should never exeeed the power of the Turkish forees stationed at the Asia Minor eoast. On the other hand, Turkey is free to proeeed to any type of militarisation of its Aegean eoast. But this would automaticaııy reeognise Greeec the right to reeiproeate by building up its military presenee in the Eastem Aegean islands. Thus, the degree of the Greek military presenee in the above islands is absolutely determined by the degree of the Turkish military presenee in the Asia Minor. This means that if Turkey wishes the Grcek forees to be limited to the level spccified in Artiele 13 of the Lausanne Treaty, it should also reduee its own forees stationed at its Asia Minor eoast.
This eonelusion can be supported by an interpretation based on the intentions of the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty. To identify those intentions, however, one should draw on the said treaty's preparatory work whieh implies the examination of the record of proeeedings. They were also discussed during the meetings of the Subcommission of Experts that was appointed to consider questions of sovereignty and demilitarisation.
Political and Military Commission: The Meeting of 25 November 1922
On 25 November 1922, the Territorial and Military Commission met at 3 p.m. to discuss for first time the question of the Aegean islands~22 İsmet Pasha was invited by Lord Curzon, the chairman of the Commission, to state his views on the question.
İsmet Pasha said that the Aegcan islands, which depended geographically on Asia Minor, were of great importance for the peace and security of Anatolia and thus should be under Turkish sovereignty. Specifically, the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria that were given to Greece by the Great Powers were, according to İsmet Pasha, of vital importance from the point of view of the security of Turkey, and it was economic necessity for them to be united to Asia Minor. The disposal of these islands, he explained, had be en confined to the Great Powers on the condition that the decision should be in conformity with the interests of the parti es concerned. However, the solution of the Great Powers did not, according to İsmet Pasha, fulfil this condition, and therefore, did not satisfy Turkey.
The imperialist designs of Greece in Anatolia, İsmet Pasha continued, had shown Turkey how dangerous it was for the security of Asia Minor that these islands should be owned by Greece. Thus, it was necessary in the interests of general peace that an undertaking be given for the complete demilitarisation of these islands. According to İsmet Pasha, all existing fortifications and batteries should be entirely destroyed and dismantled and no new fortifications should be constructed in the future, while none of the said islands should be utilised as a military base. No planes should be brought there and no sheds for aircraft be constructed. Except for apolice force sufficient to keep order, no anned forces should be maintained, and these islands should not serve as a centre for agitators or as a refuge for smugglers. İsmet Pasha demanded that Turkey should receiye guarantees for the strict observance of the undertakings given in these respects. it was, therefore, necessary that these islands should enjoy a neutral and independent political existence.
Replying to İsmet Pasha, Venizelos, the Head of the Greek delegation, disputed the Turkish claim that the said islands should obtain a neutral and independent status. He argued that those islands could not compromise the security of Turkeyand recalled some military events according to which when disembarking at Smyma, the Greck troops were transported direct to AnatoHa and the islands were not used as a stopping-place. He thus made clear that the possession of the islands by a state other than Turkey did not constitute a menace for the latter.
Venizelos agrecd to examining the qucstion whcther it was necessary to demiHtarise the se islands, but he notcd that in no case could there be any question of re-establishing Turkish sovereignty over territory which had long since ceased to belong to Turkey. He stated once morc that he had no objcction to the demilitarisation of thcse islands and said that it ought to be remembered that no decision had been taken regarding the adoption of such a measure. lt had only been decided that the commission should examine the question whether demi1itarisation of the islands was expedient, and if so, to what degree.
Taking the floor, Lord Curzon said that he had discussed the matter with his A11ied colleagues and was speaking on their behalf, as well as on his own. Hc began his discourse by attempting to address the question of sovereignty of the Eastem Aegean islands and concluded that the Great Powers decision of 1914 had made clear that thcse islands had com e under Greek sovereignty.
Summarising the positions of İsmet Pasha, Lord Curzon observed that the Turkish delegation had put forward the suggestion that the islands of Lemnos, Mytilcne, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, which had been given to Grecce, should be taken away from it and placed under a special regime. At that moment. Venizclos intervcned in the discussion and said that he was under the impression that theses islands were merely to be demilitarised. Rıza Nur Bey, a Turkish delegate, replied in the negatiye and stated that they were to have a neutral and independent political existence.
Lord Curzon noted that this meant that the islands were not to be assigned to Turkey, but should be taken from Greece and given some form of political autonomy. This would result, according to Lord Curzon, in great difficulties, both from the point of view of lawand right and also as regards practicability. The islands in question. Lord Curzon continued, were a lawful Greek possession by treaty and their populations were entirely Greek in character. Previous experience, Lord Curzon argued, offered wamings against such an experimenl. Citing the cases of Samos and Crete, he concluded that the suggestion of a constitutional experiment in autonomy for those islands should be rejected on account of the wamings offered by the pasl.
As regards İsmet Pasha's point, namely demilitarisation in a very stringent form, Lord Curzon replied that much more could be said. While the question of detaching them from Greek sovereignty could not be contemplated, he made clear that their demilitarisation should be examined by the military experts. Conceming the advisability of carrying out stringent demilitarisation there, he agreed with Venizelos that the se islands had not bcen a source of danger to the Turkish military position in Anatolia, as the Greeks had made no use of them as bases. They could not. the re fo re, be reasonably regarded as a menace.
İsmet Pasha agreed to the question of demilitarisation being referred to a sub-commission and reserved the right to reply to both Lord Curzon's and Venizelos's arguments. Barrere. the French delegate, explained that except of the question of autonomy that had been rejected, the conference had all the elements necessary for a reference of the whole matter to a sub-commission of experts. Lago, the ıtalian delegate, enquired which islands were to be referred to the experts. it was then decided that the subcommission should discuss the question whether the islands of Chios, Mitylene,
Lemnos. Samos and Nikaria should be demilitarised, and if so to what degree. The commission rose at 5:20 p.m. [VOL. XXIX In the light of the war occurred between Greece and Turkey, the sub-commission took the view that so me demilitarisation measures were necessary for assuring the security of both countries. Consequently, at its meeling of the 28 November. the sub-commission unanimously recommended that it is desirable to take certain measures of demilitarisation. 23 As regards these measures, for the islands of Mytilene. Chios. Samos and Nikaria. the majority considered that the measures of demilitarisation should consist in the following restrictions:
The Meeting of the Sub-commission of Experts
• No Naval base and no fortifications .
• Military aircraft on either side to be forbiddcn to fly respectively over the islands and over Turkish territory.
• Limitation of military forces in the islands to the normal contingent called up for military service. which will thus be able to receive instruction on the spot, and to a strength of gendarmerie and police calculated on the basis of the strength of the gcndarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.
The sub-commission made clear that:
The majority is opposed to the proposal of more extensive restrietions, whieh, by plaeing the Greek islands at the merey of Turkey, might eall for the app!ieation of eorresponding restrietions to AnatoHan territory. The objeet of the provisions indieated above is, in facı, to make it impossible for Greeec to proeeed to offensive preparations in her islands against Turkey, while granting her the means whieh she needs to maintain order in her islands and to proteet the ir territory against the ineursions of bands and other attempts of a !ike order.
The Turkish delegation. constituting the minority, presented their reservation to the above proposal. This reservation was based on four points. First. according to the Turkish Delegation. at the moming's meeting, the President of the Sub-commission had argued and adduced. after long discussions. evidence to prove that the islands in question constituted a base for opcrations for an attack against Anatolia, and that the very heart of Asia Minor could 23lbid., pp. 109-11 ı. thence be threatened. After this, the Turkish side maintained, the necessity for the demilitarisation of these islands had been accepted in principle. Second, the Turkish Delegation argued that discussing the Iimits of this demilitarisation, the French Admiral Lacaze had argued that the phrase proposed by the President, 'no naval base and no military port', included a prohibition to maintain hydroplanes. Third, the Turkish side noted that when the President proposed to forbid the introduction of any artillery into the islands, His Excelleney M. Venizelos asked for permission to maintain anti-aircraft guns there, and the President repIied that as antiaircraft guns could equally well be used as field guns, it was impossible to grant this permission. Fo urth, the Turkish Delegation maintained that General Weygand had opposed the maintenance of hydroplanes in the se islands, basing his argument on the wide radius of actian of aircraft and on numerous inconvenient results which might ensue therefrom.
The Turkish side alsa argued that:
it was reeognised at the same meeting that the military establishments of the islands were eapable of threatening Anatolia, whereas the batteries plaeed on the Anatolian eoast eould in no way eonstitute a danger to Greeee herself, and that, eonsequenıly, there was no oeeasion to eonsider the military establishments on the Anaıolian eoast as having the same importanee.
The Turkish delegation were therefore astonished to observe that the proposals made to the m at the afternoon meeting had no relatian to the decision taken, on purely military grounds, in the course of the morning meeting. They were equally surprised to see that the se proposals had the character of a decision taken by the other delegations beyand what was agreed upon during the morning meeting of the sub-commission. From the standpoint of the maintenance of tranquillity and security in the Asia Minor and for reasons of a technical nature, the Turkish Delegation explained, Turkey was obliged to insist upon a different regime for the demilitarisation of the islands according to which,
• There shall be no military and naval base and no port of war in the islands of Mitylene, Samos, Oıios and Nikaria .
• No works of fortification of any sart shall be undertaken and no military establishment shall be maintained there.
• With the exception of the gendarmerie, no armed forces shall be stationed and no depot shall be established there, nor shall any military preparations whatever be undertaken .
• No aeroplane or hydroplane, nor any establishment capable of bcing utilised for' aviation purposes, may be maintained there.
Political and Militar} Commission: The Meeting of 29 November 1922
At the invitation of Lord Curzon, General Weygand read the report of the sub-commission of experts convoked. 24 General Weygand wished to make some remarks on the reservation of the Turkish delegation. He said that as far as the statement of the views of the Turkish delegation was concemed he had no observation to make. However, he wished to address the Turkish claim that at the second meeting of the sub-commission the decisions reached at the preceding meeting had not bcen taken imo account. This assertion was, in his opinion, due to a misunderstanding.
General Weygand recalled the fact that at the end of its moming meeting, the sub-commission had reached agreement on the necessity of demilitarising Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, and also on the need for discussing the demilitarisation of Lemnos together with the Straits problem, but not as regards the kind of demilitarisation to be appIied to the four-named islands. No decision had been arrived at on the lauer point. The Turkish delegation were, according to General Weygand, under a misapprehension in thinking that the sub-commission had pronounced on this question at its first meeting.
At its second meeting, the sub-commission, General Weygand explained, had examined the question of demilitarising the islands near the Straits. He had then pointed out that by its terms of reference the sub-commission was directed to examine the measures of demilitarisation to be taken in the se four islands. The Turkish delegation had remarked that the question was so closely bound up with that of the Straits that it was impossible to examine l it unless all the Powers İnterested in the Straits problem were present, particularly the Powers bordering on the Black Sea.
To this Turkish argument, General Weygand had answered, as he himself explained, that the sub-commission could make a provisional examination of the subject without prejudice, of course, to the decisions which might be tak en later on as regards the Straits. The Turkish delegation had, nevertheless, maintained their view, and had announced that they did not intend to take part in the discussion. In order that the meeting of the sub-commission should not be entirely fmitless, he had, therefore, thought it well to invite a summary discussion of the question. The Turkish delegation had not refused to remain present during that discussion.
When General Weygand completed his discourse, ısmet Pasha to ok the floor. He shared the view expressed by the Turkish Delegation at the sub-commission and endorsed the reservations made in regard to the demilitarisation of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. He argued that the measures and restrictions proposed were inadequate and that because aviation was the most modern of all weapons of war, it should be forbidden in these islands while no military detachments should be stationed there. The insuffıciency of the restrictions recommended in the sub-commissions's report made the demilitarisation, according to İsmet Pasha, almost illusory. He maintained that the report recognised that said islands could serve as bases of operations, and that the very object of the proposed measures was to make it impossible for Greece to prepare offensiye operations against Turkey in the se islands. It was, therefore, essential to demi1itarise them effectively from the strategic and mi1itary point of view, prohibiding, for example, aeronautics there as well as the presence of armed contingents. He, therefore, confirmed the reservations made by the Turkish delegation at the Sub-commission.
Caclamanos made a brief statement on behalf of the Greek delegation with which he agreed to the measures proposed by the sub-commission.
Immediately af ter Lord Curzon took the floor. He fırst thanked the sub-commission for its work and for its report which stated very clearly and concisely the reasons on which its members based their opinion. Af ter he dealt with the demilitarisation of the four islands for which the sub-commission
had recommended a modified form of demilitarisation. The latter, according to Lord Curzon, 'was designed to protect the Turks of Anatolia against an attack based on these islands, while leaving to the Greek Government the necessary power to defend the islands and preserve order there'.
Lord Curzon repeated the Turkish reservations and asked the commission to take note of this, but he also asked the commission to accept the sub-commission's conclusions. He went on congratulating General Weygand on having so successfully cleared up the misunderstanding which he regarded as quite accidental. He stated that it had now become clear that the Turkish delegation had misunderstood General Wcygand's statements at the first meeting of the sub-commission and had misinterpreted the alleged changed of attitude at the second mceting. He hoped that the incident was now closed.
İsmet Pasha asked his two objections respecting aviation and military contingents to be included in the draft resolution relating to the measures of demilitarisation to be enforced in Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. Nevertheless, the commission rejected his proposal. Lord Curzon then read aresolution with which the commission adopted the recommendations contained in the report of the sub-commission of experts regarding the measures of demilitarisation to be applied to the above islands. The rcsolution made also reference to ısmet Pasha's objections. The commission rose at 6:20 P.M.
The sub-commission's report was later embodied in the draft treaty which did not include the Turkish reservations. From the moment that the draft treaty was presented to the conference participants for review to the time of delegations departure no discussion took place conceming the demilitarisation of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands. 25 The review of the facts mentioned above makes clear that the Lausanne Treaty-makers took the view that any military measures should assure the security of both Greece and Turkey. Although the demilitarisation of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands was necessary to ensure the security of Turkey, the treaty-makers thought that demiHtarisation measures should not impair the security of the Greek islands. The intentian of treaty-makers is evident in the sub-commission's report which stated that:
The majority is opposed LO the proposal of more extensive restrietions, whieh, by plaeing the Greek islands at the merey of Turkey, might eaH for the applieation of eorresponding restrietions to Anatolian territory. The objeet of the provisions indieated above is, in Caet, to make it impossible for Greeee to proeeed to oCfensive preparations in her islands against Turkey, while granting her the means whieh she needs to maintain order in her islands and to proteet their territory against the ineursions of bands and other attempts of a like order. This intention was repeated by Lord Curzon who declared that the demilitarisation measures were 'designed to protect the Turks of Anatolia against an attack based on these islands, while leaving to the Greek Government the necessary power to defend the islands and preserve order there'. The inter-relationship between the Greek forces stationed in the Eastcm Aegean islands and the Turkish ones placed on the coast of Asia Minor is confirmed by the phrase 'extensive restrictions [in the Greek islands] ... might call for the appIication of corresponding restrictions to AnatoIian territory'. It is also confırmed by the Turkish statement, according to which; it was recognised ...that the military establishments of the islands were eapable of threatening Anatolia, whereas the batteries plaeed on the Anatolian eoast eould in no way eonstitute a danger to Greece herself, and that, eonsequently, there was no oceasion to consider the military establishments on the Anatolian coast as having the same importanee.
Actually, by stating this, the Turkish side pointed to the fact that if one day the Turkish forces placed on the Asia Minor coast could be in a position to threaten the Greek Eastem Aegean islands, then, the military establishments on that coast could be of significant importance for security relations in the Eastem Aegean.
The Turkish Aegean Anny, no matter i( targets Greece or not, is in a position to threaten the above islands and, therefore, its existcnce has important consequences for the security relations between Greeec and Turkey. Undeniably, Turkey is free to distribute its anned forces in the way it wishes. The 'principle of reciprocity', however, allows Greece to undertake the necessary defence measures aimed at preventing 'placing the Greek islands at the mercy of Turkey'.
The nccessity to ensure the security of the Greek Eastem Aegean islands is confinned by the rejection of the Turkish proposals for a stringent demilitarisation. İsmet Pasha had demanded first, that all existing fortifications and batteries in the islands to be entirely destroyed and dismantled and no new fortifications to be constructed there in the future. Second, none of the said islands to be utilised as a military base. To this extent, no military and naval base and no port of war should be established in these islands. Third, neither planes should be brought to these islands nor sheds for aircraft to be constructed there, nor any establishment capablc of being utilised for aviation purposes should be maintained in these islands. And fourtb. no armed forces should be-stationed in the islands in question, no depot should be established there and no military preparations whatever should be undertaken.
In contrast to these proposals, the Lausanne Treaty does not invoke the destruction and dismantlement of the fortifications and batteries existing in these islands prior to 1923. Second, although the said treaty prohibits the establishment of naval bases, it does not preclude the cstablishment and maintenance of military bases in the Eastem Aegean islands. Third, the Lausanne Treaty does not prevent Greeec either from bringing its military planes to the se islands and keeping them there. or from constructing sheds for those aircrafts, or from maintaining any establishment capable of being utilised for aviation purposes. And fourtb, the above treaty does not prohibit either the stationing of anned forces in the islands in question. or the establishment of depot there, or the undertaking of military exercises. The main objeet of the Lausanne Treaty was the relations betwcen Turkey on the one hand, and the rest of the states involved in the war in the Near East on the other. The main purpose of the treaty was to re-establish peaee in the Near East and seeure the borders of the newly established Turkish State.
The treaty-makers sought to address military questions the management of whieh eould provide the fertile ground for a longlasting peace. One of their main concems was to ensure the security of Turkey.
To this end, they defined relevant demilitarisation measures that should be undertaken by Greeee. However, being aware of the hostHe nature of the Greek-Turkish relations and the potential for a Greco-Turkish War in the future, the treaty-makers sought to ereate a military balance between the two countries so that neither Turkey could threaten the Greek Eastem Aegean islands, nar Greece could use these islands in offensive opcrations against Turkey.
Reciprocity and military balance were the only way in whieh a long-lasting peace between Turkeyand Greece could be achieved. No peace could last for long if the treaty-makers have allawed one of the two competitors ([urkey) to unrestrictively arın itself preventing at the same time the other party (Greece) of taking the necessary measures for defending itselr. The Lausanne Treaty defined demilitarisation measures for Greeee with the presupposition that the Turkish military presenee on the Anatolian coast would remain at a level relative to that of the Greek forces as specified in Artiele 13 of the Lausanne Treaty. But because the Turkish miIitary presence and might in the Eastem Aegean has inereased, the appIication of the 'principle of reciprocity' allows Greece to reciprocate by building up its own military presence and power in the Eastem Aegean islands, thcreby rc-establishing a military balance between the two countries.
Conclusion
The purpose of this artiele was to address the question of demilitarisation of the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, ıkarla as well as the Dodecanese Islands and their adjacent islets. Providing a eomprehensive interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty. the artiele argued that the applieation of the 'principle of reciprocity' allows Greeec to maintain a military presenee in the said islands relative to that of the Turkish forees stationed on the eoast of Asia Minor. This argument is fundamentally different that those advaneed by Athens and stands in sharp contrast to the Turkish view.
Three are the most important implieations stemming from this interpretation. First. Greeee obtains a legal right to militarise the above islands irrespeetively of the existenee of Turkish threats .
Thus, it is not necessary for Athens to invoke Artiele 5 ıof the UN Charter. Second. the Lausanne Treaty prohibits Greece from maintaining a military prescnce in the islands in qucstion that exeeeds that of Turkey on the eoast of Asia Minor. The Lausanne Treaty allows Greeee to reciproeate but not to drive for military superiority in the Eastem Aegean. Finally, the degree of the Greek miliıary prcsenee in the said islands can only be delermined by Ankara itself sinee it is the degree of the Turkish miliıary presenee on the Anaıolian coast thal generaıes the right to Greeee to reciproeate.
